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Abstract
This article builds a micro founded model of the clash of cultures.
The clash is dened as the parents fear of a trait change by their child
in an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmis-
sion of cultural traits. The extent of the clash is manipulated by
cultural leaders who benet from the cultural education e¤ort by par-
ents. We identify three channels through which the leaders can a¤ect
the clash of cultures: (i) by providing benecial cultural values, (ii)
by claims of cultural superiority and (iii) by cultural alienation, i.e.
by inducing cultural dislike towards their own group. We show that
all three channels can be in the leaders interest but channels (ii) and
(iii) reduce the utility of the leaders goup members. This hints to a
strong conict of interest within groups - between the population at
large and the benefactors of radicalization. We further show how the
use of alienation relates to the economic opportunities available to a
group.
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1 Introduction
The expression "clash of civilizations" or "clash of cultures" has become a
winged word after the attacks on the twin towers on 11 September 2001.
Originally brought up as term by the historian Bernard Lewis1 the expres-
sion was made famous by Huntingtons book "The Clash of Civilizations and
the Remaking of a World Order" (1996). His main hypothesis is that the fun-
damental source of conict in the post cold war period will be along cultural
and religious lines. In his words: "The fault lines between civilizations will
be the battle lines of the future" (Huntington 1993). The debate surrounding
the work has received a sense of urgency after the September 11 attacks. Its
merit has been debated - not the least for the di¢ culty of dening a "civi-
lization".2 Nonetheless it had an important role in framing the debate on a
whole range of issues.
This article builds a micro motivated model of the clash of civilizations
in order to explain its importance for public debate and policy actions. To
build a model of the clash we adopt the framework of cultural transmission of
preferences by Bisin and Verdier (2001). In their model parents maximize the
utility of their children by choosing an educational e¤ort that determines the
probability that the children receive the parents cultural trait. If education
fails the child adopts the cultural trait of a randomly selected member of the
parents generation (oblique transmission). The "clash" in this framework
is the parents fear that children will adopt a di¤erent trait. In our model
this fear is quantied by two components: (i) a purely cultural component
- the cultural dislike parameter - and by an economic component capturing
the economic (dis)advantage of one trait over the other.
However, a realistic micro model of the conict needs to account for the
fact that the propagation of culture and education employs a host of profes-
sional agents (Madras school teachers, the pope, politicians, book authors...)
who we call "cultural leaders". They receive rents from the population at
large (wage payments, book sales or simply the ego rents) in exchange for the
provision of cultural characteristics (discussion of moral, speeches, lectures,
education, art). In our model the extend of the clash is therefore deter-
mined by these cultural leaders who benet from the educational e¤ort of
1Lewis used the term rst in his article in the September 1990 issue of The Atlantic
Monthly titled "The Roots of Muslim Rage".
2See also the criticism by Sen (2006) who stresses the complexity of human identities.
According to Sen a "clash" on one of these dimensions is a choice not a destiny.
2
their group members. We analyze how the vested interest of cultural leaders
shapes the clash of cultures and the welfare of the population at large.
As a rst step we use our model to categorize the channels through which
cultural leaders inuence the clash of civilizations. These are: (i) the provi-
sion of cultural goods that make the culture more appealing to the ingroup,
(ii) claims of cultural superiority which makes the outgroup culture less ap-
pealing to the ingroup and iii) alienation which makes the ingroup culture
less appealing to the outgroup. Clearly, ingroup manipulation (channels (i)
and (ii)) a¤ect educational rents directly. Outgroup manipulation (channel
(iii)) a¤ects rents indirectly through its e¤ect on the new steady state.
We show that both the provision of cultural goods and claiming cultural
superiority is always in the leaders interest because they increase both the
spending per parent and the equilibrium group size of the ingroup. More
surprisingly, we show that alienation can also be in the interest of the cul-
tural leader. Alienation mobilizes the outgroup against the leaders group
which implies a higher educational e¤ort in the outgroup. In the new steady
state the leaders group shrinks and both groups exert higher educational ef-
fort. The leader now cashes in more per group member. If these extra gains
dominate the leaders losses due to the smaller group size, the general radi-
calization is in the leaders interest. This could explain why recent violence is
so often motivated by cultural di¤erences. Culturally motivated violence in-
duces cultural radicalization and is therefore encouraged or at least tolerated
by cultural leaders.
Our welfare analysis shows that both claims of superiority and alienation
are not in the populations interest. A corollary of this result is that a clash
of civilizations caused by negative views on the respective outgroup is truly
a conict between the benefactors of the cultural rents and the population at
large. The fact that cultural leaders benet from radicalization per se, even
if it harms the size of their group, leads to perverse incentives for leaders
in both camps. Leaders have an incentive to support violence against the
outgroup and can use the atrocities conducted against their own group to
claim superiority over the outgroup. The fact that leaders might play into
each others hands can explain why cultural conict is so hard to tackle and
calm.
The total value of a certain cultural trait does not only depend on peoples
feelings towards this trait but also on the economic opportunities people
with this trait are facing. We capture economic opportunities by allowing
for trait dependent wages. This allows us to analyze the interaction between
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economic factors and the use of alienation (e.g. violence). Alienation is not a
feasible strategy for the leader if his group is economically very disadvantaged
or if alienation leads to even higher economic disadvantages. This has two
important implications: (i) a minority that is less disadvantaged economically
will be culturally more aggressive.3 (ii) institutional/structural limits to
discrimination might encourage alienation. While these institutional limits
are often set up by the majority group itself, the creation of a minority sector
that is protected from wage discrimination can serve an equivalent purpose
for the cultural leader of the minority. We show that cultural leaders of
su¢ ciently intolerant minority groups - groups with a su¢ ciently high level
of cultural dislike towards the majority group - will always destroy labor
market integration. In doing so, they reduce the size of their own group but
benet from an increased education e¤ort resulting from the possibility of
higher alienation under economic isolation of the minority group.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section
we will defend the main building block of our model that rents generated in
the production of culture are a powerful force in the creation of sentiments
of cultural superiority and dislike towards other cultures. Section 3 develops
the basic components of our model. Section 4 contains our main results
on cultural leaders and the clash of civilizations. In section 5 we provide a
detailed analysis of the economic environment. In particular, we examine
the incentives for cultural alienation if cultural alienation leads to increased
discrimination in the labor market. We also study under which conditions a
minority sector that is shielded from the e¤ects of cultural alienation on labor
market discrimination will successfully attract minority workers. In Section
6 we connect our results to terrorism, discuss the existence of destructive
leaders and relate our results to other conict models. Section 7 concludes.
2 Cultural Rents and Cultural Leaders
The main argument in this article is that the existence of "cultural" rents
can be a strong incentive in the creation of a sentiment of fear and hatred.
But what are these cultural rents and who benets from them? To illustrate
what we have in mind we provide two examples of important cultural rents
enjoyed by religious leaders.
3This might explain why recent religiously motivated terror attacks were all performed
by relatively well-o¤ Muslims.
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Example 1 Pakistan is a good example of a country where the state leaders
have lost the cultural leadership and educational role to other parties. It
is estimated that Madrasas and Mosques in Pakistan gather over 70 billion
rupees (around U.S. $ 1.1 billion) from resident Pakistanis each year. The
explicit aim of Madrasas is the promotion of an Islamic ethos in students.
Although human capital accumulation (learning how to read and write for
example) is part of the education, a major criticism of these schools is that
they do not prepare students for a life outside the Madras and Mosque world.
Attempts of changing the curriculum of Madrasas has been met with erce
resistance by the ulema (teachers running the seminaries). The International
Crisis Group summarizes in its report (page 3):
"Any suggestion of change in the traditional sector of Islamic instruction
makes the clergy suspicious of government intentions. They are willing to
teach non-religious subjects but "secularisation" is their worst fear, and they
vow ercely to resist it."
In fact, the rents (in terms of inuence and nance) from running the
cultural formation in Pakistan are so large that the Pakistani government has
become dependent on the groups running it.
Example 2 The Vatican is another example of cultural leadership with sub-
stantial rents. A rough idea of the amount of revenue channeled through the
Catholic church is the budget of the Holy See - the episcopal jurisdiction of
the Catholic Church in Rome. It alone commands revenue above 230 million
Euros per year. And this is only a very small share of the overall revenue. Al-
together, the Vatican estimated employment of 408,024 priests of the Catholic
Church in 2007.4 In addition, the pope enjoys considerable media attention
and inuence. His word is taken as representative for over a billion members
of the church.
But religious leaders are not the only ones who benet from cultural
e¤orts of the population. Journalists, politicians and even academics benet
directly from the desire of the population to be culturally educated. The
history is crowded with cases where politicians / journalists or academics
who act as cultural leaders directly benet from a cultural conict in the
inuence or even resources they receive. A simple example is the book "Clash
of Civilizations" itself which has received considerably more attention after
11 September 2001.
4Annuario Ponticio 2007, Vatican City: Vatican Publishing House.
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3 The Model
Our basic model is based on Bisin and Verdiers (2001) model of cultural
transmission of preferences. In this model a society of size 1 has two possible
cultural traits, trait 1 and trait 2. The fraction of individuals having trait 1
is q and the fraction of individuals having trait 2 is q2 = 1   q. We follow
Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002) in the way overlapping generations are modeled:
a Poisson birth and death process keeps the population size of active agents
constant.5
We adopt Assumption 1 from Bisin and Verdier (2001), that parents have
imperfect empathy: they can correctly evaluate the economic perspectives of
their children but evaluate their childs future utility through their own eyes
and therefore would like their children to adopt their own cultural trait. In
other words, let V ij be the utility of a type i parent of having a trait j child.
Imperfect empathy implies that V ii > V ij so that 1 = V 11   V 12 > 0 and
2 = V
22 V 21 > 0. The parameters 1 and 2 can therefore be interpreted
as the fear of a trait change within the family.
Parents choose their education e¤ort di which determines the probability
that their child will be of their own type. We assume that the costs of edu-
cation are C(di) = 12d
2
i . If education fails, the child bumps into a randomly
chosen member of the parents society and copies his preferences. Therefore
the probability P ij of a type i parent to have a type j child are given by:
P 11 = d1 + (1  d1)q
P 22 = d2 + (1  d2)(1  q)
P 12 = (1  d1)(1  q)
P 21 = (1  d2)q
and di is chosen to maximize
max
di
Ui = P
iiV ii + P ijV ij   1
2
d2i (1)
5The survival probability of an active agent is  each period. With probability 1  an
active agent has a child without any predetermined preferences who will becomes active
the next period. For simplicity we look at life-time values. This saves on notation. If we
only looked at per period values everything would have to be multiplied by 11  to get
life-time utilities.
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which for the di¤erent groups can be written as
max
d1
V 11   (1  q)(1  d1)1   1
2
d21 (2)
max
d2
V 22   q(1  d2)2   1
2
d22 (3)
leading to the following optimal education e¤orts
d1 = 1(1  q) (4)
d2 = 2q (5)
which means that educational e¤ort is higher the greater the fear of a trait
change and the smaller the respective trait group. Direct and oblique social-
ization are cultural substitutes.
The population dynamics can be written as follows:
qt+1 = qt + (1  )(qtP 11t + (1  qt)P 21t )
= qt + (1  )qt((d1 + (1  d1)qt) + (1  qt)(1  d2))
qt+1   qt = (1  )qt(1  qt)(d1   d2)
Hence in steady state
0 = (1  )q(1  q)(d1   d2)
which has three rest points, q = 0 and q = 1 and the interior rest point
d1 = d2 which by Proposition 1 in Bisin and Verdier (2001) is the only stable
rest point. Hence the stable steady state is determined by
1 (1  q) = 2q
so that the equilibrium group size of trait 1 is given by
q =
1
1 +2
: (6)
We will concentrate our analysis on this equilibrium q and consider which
steady state outcome would be the most preferred outcome of the cultural
leader of group 2. We will refer to trait 1 as the "majority" trait and trait 2
as the "minority" trait.
Note that the equilibrium group size and the educational e¤ort can be
expressed as a function of 1 and 2, the fear of a trait change within the
family. We rst examine what determines this parameter.
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3.1 Economic Opportunities and Cultural Dislike
We assume that each trait has an intrinsic value uij which is the pleasure
derived by a type i parent if his child holds cultural value j. Since by as-
sumption parents care about the survival of their cultural trait uii  uij. We
will refer to fi  uii   uij as cultural dislike. In order to model the clash of
civilizations we assume that cultural leaders can a¤ect these values. Details
are discussed in section 4.
Apart from cultural values the utility of parents is also determined by
the economic opportunities of their o¤springs. We assume that these are
objectied, i.e. the perspective on economic opportunities is independent of
the trait. In general, we will refer to the life-time economic opportunities as
wages wi where i refers to the cultural trait of the child. We assume that
w1  w2. This assumption can reect two di¤erent economic environments:
(i) everybody works in the same sector but there is wage discrimination
against cultural trait 2 (or equivalently this trait has a lower productivity),
(ii) the di¤erent traits work in separated sectors and the minority sector is
less productive.
As a rst step it is useful to combine the cultural and economic factors
in the expressions of V ij (the utility of a type i parent of having a trait j
child). They are
V 11 = u11 + w1
V 12 = u12 + w2
= u11   f1 + w2
V 22 = u22 + w2
V 21 = u22   f2 + w1:
where we have rewritten the utility after a trait change with the help of our
denition of cultural dislike. The fear of a trait change for the majority, 1,
can be written as
1 = f1 + (w1   w2) (7)
where the rst term reects the cultural dislike while the second term reects
the loss of economic opportunity of the child. Keep in mind that the fear of
a trait change is what gives parents an incentive to educate their children.
Hence, majority parents are motivated both by their cultural preferences and
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the anticipation of their childrens economic well-being.6 In the minority, fear
of a trait change takes the form
2 = f2   (w1   w2) (8)
which follows the logics of the majority except for now, unequal economic
opportunities demotivate educational e¤ort. For cultural survival to be pos-
sible 2 > 0. Hence (u22   u21) > (w1   w2) is needed for the survival of
trait 2. In other words, the minorities dislike for the majority trait has to
compensate the wage di¤erential if the minority trait is to survive in the long
run.
The overall level of fear of a trait change in society is
1 +2 = f1 + f2 (9)
and as shown above the equilibrium size of the majority is given by
q =
f1 + (w1   w2)
f1 + f2
(10)
which implies that the equilibrium size of the majority is increasing in the
extent of wage discrimination against the minority and the cultural dislike
of the majority towards the minority.
In what follows we use these results to explain how cultural leaders and
the clash of civilizations are linked.
4 Cultural leaders and the Clash of Civiliza-
tions
Our explanation of the clash of civilizations hinges on two assumptions. First,
we assume that cultural leaders benet directly from the educational e¤orts
of their group, i.e. by increasing the attention, power or income they receive.
In order to model this we assume that the leader maximizes the sum of
cultural expenses in the minority given by
U2leader =
1
2
d22(1  q) =
1
2
22q
2(1  q): (11)
6In this basic specication cultural dislike does not a¤ect purely economic variables
which allows us to isolate purely cultural e¤ects. This assumption is relaxed in Section
5 where we explicitely discuss economic opportunities and their possible link to cultural
dislike.
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Intuitively cultural leaders benet from the extent of fear of a trait change
in their group 2 and the size of the group (1   q). The term q2 captures
the existence of a free rider problem in cultural transmission. Parents have
an incentive to free-ride on the education of society at large. The larger the
group of the leader, the more free-riding opportunities society o¤ers. Hence,
per capital e¤ort is decreasing in group size.
The second assumption is that cultural leaders can a¤ect the extent of the
clash (directly or indirectly). Our discussion of the fear of a trait change pa-
rameters above allows us to identify three cultural channels for this inuence.
A fourth channel, namely the manipulation of the economic opportunities of
the di¤erent traits, is discussed in Section 5.
Cultural Goods: leaders can provide cultural goods that can only be
consumed within the setting of the trait. In the model this implies a rise
of uii. Examples are the provision/teaching of rules or knowledge that help
individual or community life, creation of art that are complementary to other
works in the culture or simply entertainment that is accessible only for those
having the trait.
Cultural Superiority: if the possibility of providing utility-enhancing
cultural goods is very costly, leaders might try to lower, uij, which is the per-
ception that parents have of the other culture. Examples are the description
of the other cultural trait as barbaric, stressing the lack of freedom in that
group or the use of religious arguments (the prospect of hell for example)
to instill fear of a trait change. An important driver of this sentiment are
stories of injustices or atrocities towards the ingroup as in Glaeser (2002).
Cultural Alienation: another possibility of cultural leaders is to in-
crease the fear of a trait change within the other group by lowering uji: Most
prominently this is achieved through violent acts/terror against members of
the other trait which make explicit reference to the fact that the ingroup
trait is responsible for the violence. The ingroup trait will be regarded as
radical, harmful or barbaric by the outgroup. To some degree this is what
happened after the September 11 attacks. But, of course, there are other
possibilities for alienation. Provocations, threats or public displays of hatred
in the name of the trait by religious and political leaders can be e¤ective
ways to alienate other traits. Indeed, cultural conicts often feature actions
by cultural leaders that appear irrational at rst sight because they clearly
discredit the ingroup.
We ignore the possibility of providing cultural goods for the other group,
i.e. raising ujj: Our rational is that for leader i, the benets of raising uii
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are higher and, thus, as raising uii and ujj cost the same, ujj will never be
raised.
We now analyze the incentives of the cultural leaders to follow di¤erent
clash strategies. Both production of cultural goods and claims of cultural
superiority over the outgroup are indeed common by both political or reli-
gious leaders. Our model conrms that they are in the interest of cultural
leaders.7
Proposition 1 If cultural leaders can a¤ect f2  u22   u21 they will try to
maximize it. The minority population always supports an increase of u22 and
never supports a decrease of u21:
Proof. See appendix.
In words, the cultural leader has a large interest in raising cultural dislike
of the minority group.8 This claim can be either supported through the
provision of cultural values (raising u22) or through making the other culture
appear inferior (lowering u21). Since parents have to live with a chance that
their children change culture, the latter strategy is less desirable from their
perspective as it increases anxiety.
More surprisingly, cultural leaders can have an interest to alienate the
outgroup.
Proposition 2 Alienation, i.e. an increase of cultural fear (lower u21) to-
wards the minority is supported by the cultural leader as long as the minority
is su¢ ciently large (q < 2
3
): Alienation it is not in the minorities interest.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2 is our main nding. The intuition for this result is that the
leader prefers a small radical group to a large unmotivated group. An increase
in cultural dislike towards the minority leads to an increased individual e¤ort
in education and hence to more radicalization. The optimum from the point
of view of the leader is reached when the minority is su¢ ciently small. The
7In our main analysis we abstract from the cost side of changing f1 or f2. The analysis
reveals when the marginal benet of increasing f1 or f2 is positive, and hence might be
in the leaders interest. If increasing f1 and f2 is costly, leaders would choose the point
where this marginal benet equals the marginal cost. We will discuss costly increases of
f1 and f2 later in this section.
8For costly changes in f2, the result can be interpreted as saying that cultural leaders
will maximize f2 subject to the cost of producing it.
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appendix reveals the exact mechanism. A rise in cultural dislike towards the
minority a¤ects the minority indirectly. It increases the e¤ort of majority
parents, shrinks the minority and therefore forces minority parents to become
more radical to make up for the decrease in free-riding possibilities.
One interesting question is how the di¤erences in economic opportunities
between the two traits a¤ects the leaders incentive for cultural alienation.
To answer that question note that by
q =
f1 + (w1   w2)
f1 + f2
:
the wage gap (w1 w2) increases the size of the majority q: Remember that
for optimal alienation the leader strives for q = 2
3
. If q increases due to an
increase in (w1   w2) then f1 needs to fall to decrease q again.
Corollary 1 If cultural leaders maximize their utility using alienation (f1),
alienation decreases with the wage gap (w1   w2). In other words, a minority
that is less disadvantaged economically will be culturally more aggressive.
Corollary 1 might appear puzzling. It stems from the fact that, in the
leaders optimum, wage discrimination and alienation are substitutes. If
the leaders group is economically very disadvantaged the pressures on the
minority to change trait are large. This implies that alienation as a strategy of
increasing revenue is not feasible. The fact that recent religiously motivated
terror acts were all performed by relatively well-o¤ Muslims could be seen
as evidence that this concept of a "capacity for alienation" is not too far
fetched.9
We now turn to the issue when the leader prefers ingroup manipulation
(changing f2) to outgroup manipulation (changing f1).
Proposition 3 If an increase of f2 and an increase of f1 have the same cost
to the leader, the leader prefers to increase f2 for all q > 25 :
Proof. See appendix.
9Empirical studies demostrate that terrorist operatives tend not to be from societies
worst-o¤ socioeconomic group. On the contrary, they have above average educational
achievements and are less likely to live in poverty than the average person (Krueger and
Malechova (2003), Berribi (2007)). Bueno de Mesquita (2005) provides a theoretical model
for these ndings.
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It will us useful to illustrate Proposition 3 for the case in which both
increasing f1 and increasing f2 is costless for the leader. Proposition 2 stated
that alienation was desirable for the leader for all q < 2
3
. Hence the leader
will switch from cultural alienation to increasing f2 at q = 25 . It is important
to note that the e¤ect of these two strategies on q is exactly opposite. While
increasing f2 raises q, increasing f1 lowers it. The result is a mixture between
provision of cultural goods and alienation at a minority size 1  q = 3
5
:
If changing f1 and f2 is not costless, Proposition 3 still tells us that the
marginal benet from increasing f2 is bigger than the marginal benet from
increasing f1 if and only if q > 25 . But now the leader will also have to
evaluate the marginal cost of each strategy. Recall that raising f2 can be
done in two ways, by the provision of utility enhancing cultural goods and
by successful claims of cultural superiority leading to utility losses of the
leaders group. While the provision of positive cultural goods is likely to be
costly, claims of cultural superiority might be cheap, especially if they can be
rooted in actions from the other group. The present "clash" has generated a
host of atrocities on both sides that can be used to claim cultural superiority.
Hence, it is reasonable to assume that at least at some point increasing f2 is
cheaper through claims of cultural superiority leading to a conict of interests
between the leader and his group. For similar reasons, glorication of past
atrocities or tolerance towards present atrocities committed by the own group
can be relatively cheap methods of cultural alienation (increasing f1).
Claims of cultural superiority and attempts to alienation are not benecial
for the population at large. A comparison of propositions 1 and 2 allows us
to make statements about the conict of interest between cultural leaders
and the general public. Clearly, due to symmetry cultural leaders of the
majority will have the same interest as their peers in the minority. Similarly
the majority population shares the interest in uii with the minority.
Corollary 2 Cultural leaders of both majority and minority share an interest
in escalating the clash as long as both groups are not too unequal in size.
Members of the groups prefer a setting with high uii and low uij:
Corollary 2 delivers a striking re-interpretation of the "clash of civiliza-
tions". The clash is to a large degree due to the existence of cultural leaders
in both groups who have an incentive to provoke intolerance and fear on
both sides of the clash. While the population benets from the production
of positive value it is a¤ected negatively by the fear created by an atmosphere
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of intolerance. Increasing radicalization on both sides requires an increasing
amount of investment in education - this furthers the interest of leaders.
The above analysis has taken the economic environment as given. How-
ever, the actions of cultural leaders might change this environment. We turn
to this issue in the next section.
5 The Role of Economic Opportunities
The above analysis assumed that cultural manipulations had no e¤ects on
the economic opportunities of the groups. However, it is likely that if the
minority leader successfully uses the strategy of cultural alienation, this does
not only a¤ect how much cultural dislike the majority parents feel in case of
a trait change of their child, but also the economic opportunities of the mem-
bers of the minority. In other words, the majority might increase their fear
towards the minority and this increased fear might translate into increased
discrimination.10
Indeed there are several empirical studies that suggest an e¤ect of major
terror attacks on labor market discrimination. Kaushal et al. (2007) nd
a real wage decline of 9-11% and reduced interstate mobility for rst- and
second generation Arab and Muslim men in the US following 9/11. Similarly,
Dávila and Mora (2005) nd evidence of wage drop of Arab men in the US
after 9/11. Rabby (2007) nds similar e¤ects using household survey data
sets to estimate the e¤ects of 9/11 and the July 2005 London bombing on
the labor market outcomes of Arabs, South-Asians and Muslims living in the
US and in the UK in a di¤erence-in-di¤erences framework.
First, it will be helpful to understand whether or not increased discrimi-
nation can be in the minoritys leaders interest.
10The theoretical literature o¤ers two mechanisms how this could happen: (i) cultural
alienation might lead to an increased taste for discrimination (Becker (1971)) which would
lead to more equilibrium discrimination in search models with rm discrimination (Black
(1995), Rosen (1997)), co-worker discrimination (Sasaki (1999)). (ii) The statistical dis-
crimination literature (e.g. Phelps (1972), Aigner and Cain (1977), Morgan and Vardy
(2009) and Cornell and Welch (1996)) o¤ers an alternative explanation for increased dis-
crimination after alienation even in the absence of a taste for discrimination. This litera-
ture suggests that empoyers have to rely on interviews to predict an employees produc-
tivity and that interviews with somebody belonging to a di¤erent culture produce noisier
signals than interviews with members from the same culture. Cultural alienation increases
the nose of the signal even further.
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Proposition 4 If the only e¤ect of alienation is to increase wage discrimi-
nation towards the minority the leader benets from alienation as long as the
minority is su¢ ciently large (q < 2
5
)
Proof. See Appendix
Wage discrimination is only in the leaders interest if the minority is a very
large group. This restriction stems from the fact that an increase in wage
discrimination demotivates minority educational e¤ort if children are likely
to take on the majority trait without e¤ort (for all q  1
2
). As the minority
grows it is increasingly immune to the economic lure (think of the extreme
of q = 0). The situation is then similar to the one described in proposition
2. Wage discrimination leads to high e¤ort in the majority which, in turn,
forces the minority to exert e¤ort in order to prevent group decline.
Proposition 4 suggests that cultural alienation might be less attractive
for the leader if economic opportunities of the minority are more a¤ected.
We now check whether this intuition is conrmed in a formal model. Assume
that
w1   w2 = f1
where   0 measures how much cultural dislike translates into discrimina-
tion. This leads to the following fear parameters:
1 = (1 + )f1
2 = f2   f1
1 +2 = f1 + f2
The stable equilibrium is given by
q =
(1 + )f1
f1 + f2
(12)
Indeed,
Proposition 5 The optimal level of cultural alienation f1 is decreasing in
.
Proof. See appendix
Proposition 5 has the following surprising implication:
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Corollary 3 If economic opportunities are less a¤ected by cultural alienation
the strategy becomes more attractive for the cultural leader.
In other words, restrictions on wage discrimination - instead of helping
the minority - might backre because they increase the leaders capacity for
alienation. We can think of two di¤erent reasons why wage discrimination
does not react to alienation. (i) Institutional constraints prevent majority
employers from discriminating against the minority. (ii) The minority has
developed its own sub-economy that is independent of cultural sentiments
in the majority.11 Corollary 3 suggests that the cultural leader might be
interested in developing such a minority sector. We turn to this question
next.
5.1 A minority sector
In an environment where cultural alienation leads to more discrimination,
the creation of a minority sector might benet the cultural leaders interest
since it puts an upper bound to wage discrimination. If discrimination is too
high, everybody will move to the minority sector. Formally,
V 11 = u11 + w1
V 12 = (u11   f1) + max fw2; w1   f1g
V 22 = u22 +max fw2; w1   f1g
V 21 = (u22   f2) + w1
where w2 is now the wage in a separate minority sector while w1   f1
describes the wage of an integrating minority member.
This model has two equilibrium candidates:
1. In the rst candidate qS there is separation in the labor market and
cultural alienation does not have an e¤ect on discrimination. Since 2
is totally independent from f1 we know from the previous analysis that
11It is not uncommon that the minority develops an informal sector that relies on mi-
nority social networks for enforcement etc. In an international context the lack of an
economic backlash is most obvious in oil producing countries. Economic opportunity in
these resource rich countries remains independant from the cultural feeling of the West
towards these countries.
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the leader sets fS1 such that
qS =
fS1 + (w1   w2)
fS1 + f2
=
2
3
; (13)
hence
fS1 = 2f2   3(w1   w2) (14)
2. In the second candidate qI the labor market is integrated and cultural
alienation a¤ects the amount of labor market discrimination. Hence qI
is given by equation (12) namely by
qI =
(1 + )f I1
f I1 + f2
(15)
and the optimal fear level was derived in Appendix E as
f I1 = f

1 =
f2
4
p
(1 + 5)2 + 16  (1 + 5)

: (16)
Observe that separation will never be an equilibrium if the minority
prefers to work in the discriminating majority sector for the optimal fear
parameter of the separation equilibrium candidate fS1 . Similarly, labor mar-
ket integration will never be an equilibrium if at f I1 the minority prefers the
minority sector. If both equilibria are feasible the cultural leader will imple-
ment the equilibrium that maximizes his utility. Proposition 6 characterizes
the equilibrium.
Proposition 6 The equilibrium outcomes are as follows
1. Labor market integration qI if the cultural dislike of the minority to-
wards the majority is low, namely
f2 <
1 + 3
2
(w1   w2) (17)
2. Labor market separation qS if the cultural dislike of the minority to-
wards the majority is high. In particular,
f2 >
4(w1   w2)p
(1 + 5)2 + 16  (1 + 5) : (18)
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3. For intermediate levels of cultural dislike of the minority towards the
majority, namely
(1 + 3)(w1   w2)
2
< f2 <
4(w1   w2)p
(1 + 5)2 + 16  (1 + 5)
the religious leader will induce labor market separation qS whenever
(1 
p
B)f2 > (w1   w2) (19)
and the integration equilibrium qI otherwise where B < 1 is dened by
equation (25) in appendix F. Moreover qI < qS.
Proof. See appendix
Proposition 6 tells us that only leaders of su¢ ciently intolerant (high f2)
minority groups will be able to destroy labor market integration. Since the
minority group will only be willing to work in the majority sector when there
is little cultural alienation, the proportion of the minority in the integrated
labor market is higher than in the separated labor market when both labor
markets are possible. Hence inducing the switch from the integration equi-
librium to the separation equilibrium implies that the leader will cash in the
education e¤ort of fewer people. However, per capita education e¤ort will
be higher because direct and oblique socialization are cultural substitutes.
Moreover, the e¤ect of cultural alienation is di¤erent in the integrated and
the separated labor market. In the integrated labor market cultural alien-
ation has an additional e¤ect, namely it increases wage discrimination and
thereby reduces the attractiveness of being a member of the minority. Once
this e¤ect is gone due to a switch to the minority sector, the marginal bene-
t of cultural alienation for the cultural leader makes a jump which explains
why labor market separation might be optimal for the leader.
The following proposition tells us how the creation of a minority sector
depends on the other variables of the model.
Proposition 7 The successful creation of a minority sector becomes more
likely the smaller w1   w2, the higher  and the higher f2.
Proof. See appendix
In the appendix we show that conditions (18) and (19) are more likely to
hold and condition (17) is more likely to be violated the smaller w1 w2, the
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higher  and the higher f2. The intuition is as follows. The smaller w1 w2,
the more attractive is the minority sector per se. Similarly, the higher the
possible wage discrimination when working in the majority sector (high ),
the more attractive the minority sector becomes where this wage discrim-
ination is avoided. Moreover, high  limits the possibility of the cultural
leader to induce cultural alienation in the integration equilibrium consider-
ably. Hence, it is worthwhile for the leader to increase cultural alienation
su¢ ciently to get to the separation equilibrium where the group is protected
from discrimination.
Proposition 7 implies that small changes in cultural dislike towards the
majority (higher f2) or a build-up of economic opportunities for the minority
outside of the majoritys economy (lower w1 w2) can trigger drastic changes
in incentives to alienate. Once the thresholds given in conditions (18) and
(19) are fullled the leader will want to drive f1 up considerably. This in
turn will lead to more economic discrimination (lower w1   f1).12
6 Discussion
We now discuss several aspects of our results. In particular, we explain why
the framework presented here could shed some lights on the use of terrorism.
We then discuss the existence of destructive leaders and how our results relate
to other models of conict.
6.1 Terrorism
Our model can explain certain aspects of recent terror attacks if we interpret
terror as a way to achieve cultural alienation. However, before we extend
these arguments it is useful to review the related literature on the e¤ects of
terror.
In the complex modern world our evolutionary response to terror fuels
a "us/them" mentality and a response of hatred against the outgroup.13
12If we introduced economic heterogeneity of minority members then this e¤ect of alien-
ation could imply a re-enforcement of the mechanism. More minority members leaving the
majority sector would make the minority increasingly immune to economic discrimination
and, hence, make alienation increasingly attractive for the leader.
13For a nice description of the psychology of terror see McCauley (2007). For a connec-
tion to hatred see Freyd (2002).
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Hence, terror attacks are likely to emphasize cultural identities and cultural
di¤erences. In addition, cultural world views and self-esteem act as anxiety
bu¤ers. Reminders of ones own mortality intensify e¤orts to uphold cultural
world-views and self-esteem,14 in particular they increase nationalism and
prejudice15 and the support of charismatic leaders.16
Apart from psychological experiments there is a substantial body of em-
pirical evidence that conrms that terror increases prejudice. According to
the FBI, hate crimes targeting Muslims increased by 1600% from 2000 to
2001. Also hate crimes against people of Middle Eastern origin increased
from 354 attacks in 2000 to 1501 attacks in 2002 (Oswald, 2005). Sheridan
(2006) investigates levels of self-reported racial and religious discrimination
in a sample of 222 British Muslims. Respondents indicate that following Sep-
tember 11th, 2001, levels of implicit or indirect discrimination rose by 82.6%
and experiences of overt discrimination by 76.3%. Kam and Kinder (2007)
provide evidence that American ethnocentrism (dened as the commonplace
human tendency to partition the social world into virtuous ingroups and
nefarious outgroups) powerfully underwrites support for the war on terror-
ism, and the strength of the relationship between ethnocentrism and opin-
ion is inuenced in part by the extraordinary events of 9/11. Hitlan et al.
(2007) examine prejudice and perceived threat toward Mexican and Arab im-
migrants/immigration along the U.S./Mexico border before and after 9/11.
While American identity is shown to be positively related to higher prejudice
and threat perceptions, prejudice and symbolic threat perception of Arab im-
migrants increased sharply after the September 11 attacks. Canetti-Nisim et
al. (2009) provide evidence that in Israel terrorism induces nondemocratic
attitudes that threatens minorities.
The above evidence suggests that terror attacks can indeed work as a tool
for cultural alienation. According to our theory a second-order e¤ect of this
14This theory called "terror management theory" (TMT) is due to Greenberg et al.
(1986) and Solomon et al. (1991). TMT has been empirically conrmed in over 175
published experiments (Cohen et al. (2004)).
15Das et al. (2009) show that terrorist news increase prejudice about outgroups. Bar-Tal
and Labin (2001) study the e¤ects of terrorist attacks carried out by Palestinian extremists
on Israels stereotypes, social distance etc towards Palestinians, Jordanians and Arabs.
While in general adolescents perceptions were di¤erentiated towards the three target
groups, most negative towards Palestians, most positive towards Jordans (no conict with
Israel) and intermediate towards Arabs, the terrorist attacks caused all stereotypes of all
three groups to change in a negative direction.
16see Cohen et al (2004) and Landau et al. (2004))
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alienation should be that Muslims increase their cultural e¤orts. In other
words, terror attacks should have led to a radicalization on both sides. Un-
fortunately good data that would allow for a comparison of Muslim attitudes
across time is not available. However, the degree to which being Muslim is
forced onto Muslims by a reaction of the majority can be seen by accounts
like that of Sara Wajid, a Muslim journalist living in the UK in the aftermath
of the London terror attacks July 2005:
But most British Muslims have experienced the fetishisation of our reli-
gious identity over our citizenship - and are exhausted by it. A lower prole
would be great. In fact, a return to the closet would be a blessed relief. I miss
the relative anonymity of being British Asian.17
In addition, there are indicators, like the rise of Muslim faith based
schools,18 that suggest that Muslim identity amongst immigrants could have
strengthened. This strengthening of Muslim identity is hard to explain other
than through a second order e¤ect like the one present in our model.
Another corollary of our ndings is that there are incentives to support
terror for cultural leaders even when these attacks do not succeed in reaching
their political goals. It is therefore not a surprise that terror takes place even
if it bolsters support for more hawkish politicians in the attacked group.19
Our analysis reveals that the incentives to use terror depend very much
on the economic environment of the minority group. Corollary 1 indicates
that leaders of economically weak groups will be less tempted to conduct ter-
rorism. The reason is that the use of alienation requires a basic attractiveness
of the group which is eroded by trait-related economic misery.
Corollary 4 tells us that at the margin, restrictions on wage discrimina-
tion increase the use of terror. Hence, if the minority is forced to work in
the majority sector the absence on any institutional restriction on wage dis-
crimination is actually an anti-terror device. However, by proposition 7 the
lack of institutional restriction on wage discriminations (high ) increases
the probability of a successful creation of the minority sector where wages
are sheltered from the majoritys sentiments towards the minority. If the
17New Statesman 2009, p.
18In the UK, for example, the Ofsted 2005 annual report indicates a near doubling in
the number of independent faith schools to about 300, compared with 170 in 2003. These
include more than 100 Muslim schools and about 100 run by evangelical Christian groups.
(Source: The Times, 18 January 2005 )
19Berrebi and Klor (2008) nd, for example, that terror attacks in Israel lead to more
support for right-wing parties.
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minority is economically segregated, leaders are more tempted to support
alienation. In other words, economic isolation makes cultural alienation a
more attractive strategy.
Whether leaders use terrorism as a strategy for cultural alienation de-
pends on its costs relative to other channels. Increasing f1 is a costly strat-
egy if the leader has to sponsor violence and terror. However, if all that is
required is approval of an already existing (maybe even independent) terror
organization and words of encouragement, increasing f1 can be surprisingly
cheap. This might explain why terror organizations with a strong religious
and cultural emphasis are not easily condemned by leaders from their own
culture. How central terrorist organizations are to the clash of civilizations
might be one of the reasons why some are longer lived than others.
6.2 Destructive leaders
The above model takes the existence of leaders as given. In this context it
shows that leaders can benet from cultural alienation and cultural supe-
riority at the expense of the utility of the population. Hence, in as far as
alienation and claims of cultural superiority can be e¤ective, cultural leaders
will use them. But this harms the population at large. So why does the
population fail to replace these destructive leaders?
While we will hint at a few reasons below, a detailed answer to this
question is left for future research. It would require to model competition
between leaders. This competition can be internal or external. If there is
internal competition within the trait to become a cultural leader potential
candidates would o¤er "trait platforms" and are then selected by the popu-
lation. If parents foresee the consequences of their leader choices correctly,
internal competition is likely to be an e¤ective tool to lower abuses. However,
once a leader is in o¢ ce, he will have access to the cultural rents and might
use these rents to buy o¤ potential challengers and to establish a monopoly
position and then renege on his platform. Moreover, even if leaders do not
actively engage in cultural alienation and cultural superiority claims and only
provide positive cultures, they have no incentives to silence any attempts of
alienation and cultural superiority claims that arise among their followers.
They will free-ride on any radical that exists. Additionally, leader selection is
often institutionalized and leaders might manipulate these institutional rules
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in their favor.20
External competition to a cultural leader arises from the possibility to
launch a new cultural trait. This way of creating competition is less likely
to align incentives between population and leaders as the incentive to claim
cultural superiority might even be amplied with rising competition. As
shown by Bisin et al. (2008) and Montgomery (2008) if there are more
than two cultural traits i > 0 is not su¢ cient for cultural survival. Using
the same assumption on educational costs as in the present article, these
papers show that the two types with the highest i - the two most "radical"
types - survive but types with lower i might become extinct.21 Hence,
successful entry of a new type requires either strong economic advantages
associated with the type or a high cultural dislike towards other types or
both. Cultural traits with less economic possibilities need to emphasize their
cultural superiority: otherwise they might simply be eliminated in the ght
for cultural survival.
Whatever the reasons why the population tolerates destructive leaders,
destructive cultural leadership is an empirical fact. Alienation and claims to
superiority implies a rise in conict and numerous historical examples have
shown that rising conict has the perverse e¤ect of rallying people behind
its leaders.22 As explained above, these e¤ects are especially important if
cultural leaders from both sides of the "clash" collude by simultaneously
increasing alienation.
20Two striking features of the selection of especially religious leaders are that often
these leaders are elected for life and that there exist culturally entrenched institutions
that prohibit material wealth to these leaders. However, this restriction is often only
nominal: the leader does not own personal wealth but manages at least to some extent
the institutional wealth.
21The proofs require a constant i for all types. This is the case in the present paper.
22The rally around the ag e¤ect is mainly studied for leaders involved in interstate
conict. See e.g. Baker and Oneal (2001) for rally around the ag e¤ects in the US and
Lai and Reiter (2005) for rally around the ag e¤ects in the UK.
Colaresi (2004) uses event history techniques to analyze the likelihood of all state leaders
between 1950-1990 to be replaced from o¢ ce depending on whether they were more or
less aggressive than the leader of the rival state in a conict situation. He nds strong
evidence that leaders who are less agressive than their rivals pay an electorial price (are
more likely to lose o¢ ce).
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6.3 Relation to other conict models
Our paper relates to a series of papers on conict by Esteban and Ray, in
short ER (e.g. Esteban and Ray (1994) or Esteban and Ray (forthcoming)).
Their model generates conict contributions in the ght for a public decision
and provides a very general setting for the analysis of this conict. A main
di¤erence between the two models is that group sizes are endogenous in
our model. In addition, ER focus on situations in which conict incentives
are symmetric (with a few exceptions). We explicitly focus on asymmetric
conicts in which the distance felt by the ingroup towards the outgroup is
independent from the distance felt in the other direction.
It is nonetheless interesting to compare our results regarding alienation
with the conclusions reached in ERs classic conict framework. Remember
that in our model, alienation is chosen because there is a second order e¤ect
through shrinking group size and increased per capita e¤ort that makes this
strategy attractive. In our model alienation is only attractive if the group is
su¢ ciently afraid of a trait change and therefore not too small. The conict
function that is used in the ER framework leads to a very similar e¤ect with-
out endogenizing group sizes. In particular, Esteban and Ray (forthcoming)
show that the more active group reacts with more activism to an exoge-
nously caused increase in the activism of the other group. In other words,
individuals that benet directly from activism would try to alienate the other
group if their own group is more active already. Our results therefore seem
to generalize at least partially.
A di¤erent model of conict is provided by Glaeser (2005) who models
the incentives of politicians to create messages of hatred against an outgroup.
In his model, politicians send hate messages to gather support in a political
contest. An important di¤erence to our model is that Glaeser derives con-
ditions under which the population does not check on the stories they are
told by their politicians. If self-protection is relatively cheap compared to
a verication of hate messages then politicians have a stronger incentive to
send these messages. While our model is quite di¤erent, there is an interest-
ing complementarity to the Glaeser (2005) framework. Corollary 2 identies
that leaders from both groups have an interest in alienating the other group.
In the reading of Glaesers (2005) framework we have therefore shown that
leaders from both sides could actually have an incentive to cooperate in the
creation of hatred.23
23The 1994 Rwanda Genocide is an important example how e¤ective hate messages can
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A way to integrate the asymmetric information motivation of Glaesers
framework into our model would be to introduce restrictions on the lowering
of uij for the leader of group i. Alienation would then be captured by a
decreasing cost for this claim of cultural superiority. Leaders on the two
sides could then play in each others hands by supporting violence/terror and
using the other groups violence to draw the picture of a barbaric culture on
the other side of the clash. An example would be public displays of barbarism
(September 11, Abu Graib, etc.) which create a real possibility for leaders
in the other camp for spreading messages of hatred in their group.24
7 Conclusion
Our ndings indicate that if the clash of cultures can be manipulated by
leaders who gain rents from educational e¤orts then there is a danger of
considerable radicalization. However, our model allows for a more in-depth
analysis of the di¤erent characteristics of this radicalization. We identify
mostly three channels through which the leader can increase the clash of
cultures, namely
1. provision of benecial cultural values that increase utility in-group;
2. claims of cultural superiority: the spread of negative attitudes towards
other cultures that leads parents to be afraid of a trait change of their
children;
3. cultural alienation: the spread of negative attitudes in other groups
against the leaders own culture which leads to a shrinking in size of
the leaders group but higher per capita e¤ort.
By revealing these channels our paper uncovers a serious commitment
problem between the population at large and its cultural leaders. On the
one hand, the population can benet massively from the provision of cultural
be. Yanagizawa (2009) estimates that 9% of the killings can be explained by the infamous
hate radio station Radio RTLM which increased violence by 65 to77% in villages with
complete radio coverage.
24In our reading the real issue is not that stories of violence and cruelty are made up.
What is fabricated by leaders is the link to the trait. Terrorists, for example, are seen as
representing a group which su¤ers directly from their behavior.
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goods (art, moral guidance, rituals, entertainment); this channel is what
makes the world go round. It cannot be stressed enough that the deeply
rooted desire of humans to consume culture and to grow in that sense has
carried wonderful blossoms throughout the years. On the other hand, the
population is harmed by channels 2 and 3: cultural leaders have the incentive
of spreading fear within the group and outside of the group to increase per
capita expenditure. Precisely because we need to rely on cultural leaders for
the provision of positive cultural goods (channel 1) it so hard to abolish those
cultural leaders who abuse their position for rent seeking through channels 2
and 3.
By claiming cultural superiority the second channel serves as a barrier
towards adopting another culture. Our model shows that it is optimal for
cultural leaders to maximize this barrier. This provides an explanation why
cultural leaders put a lot of emphasis on their trait appearing to be very
di¤erent and incompatible with other traits. There are some indicators that
they can be successful. Many cultural/religious conicts are characterized by
rules of rejection or even harm of children who attempt to cross-breed with
other cultures or religions. This goes as far as that parents prefer the death
of their children to a change of trait.
While it is easy to understand that cultural leaders want barriers to avoid
children of their ock changing trait, it is more surprising that they might
benet from the channel of cultural alienation. Cultural alienation acts as a
barrier towards children of outsiders adopting the trait. The main reason why
cultural leaders maintain this barrier towards their own trait is because they
benet indirectly through the general radicalization implied by alienation.
In other words, our model shows that educational rents can lead to a bias
towards small radicalized groups.
Pakistan is an example of this phenomenon. The massive inuence of
religious leaders in Pakistan is based on their command over rents and not
votes.25 In other words, religious leaders in Pakistan are powerful because
Pakistani sects are (small) groups with fortied, closed ranks. Indeed, the per
capital e¤orts are so high that sectarian divisions are militarized. In total,
the resulting rents create a powerful force. The clergy backed Musharrafs
coup and supported his policies towards India. They were, however, powerful
enough to defy any attempt to reform madrasas system or eliminate Islamic
25Indeed, there is little control over votes: in the 1997 elections, the JUI of Fazlur
Rahman was the only religious party to win seats in the 217-member National Assembly.
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militancy.
We see the Pakistani example as an exception only in degrees not in the
mechanism. All around the world there are leaders who send messages that
lock their own group in by alienating the outgroup. Our results indicate that
the messages send by leaders should not be confused with the interest of
the population. With all the talk of a "clash of civilizations" and the corre-
sponding pictures on our TV screens Western products stay in high demand
in the Middle East and are actually gathering market shares at breath-taking
pace.26 If our model is applied to these countries, their general "moderniza-
tion" is consistent with a shrinking, increasingly radicalized minority which
follows religious leaders despite the considerable harm they inict on them.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Given our underlying model we use (8) and (10) to derive that @2
@f2
= 1 and
@q
@f2
=  f1+(w1 w2)
(f1+f2)2
. Therefore, the derivative of (11) with respect to f2 is
given by
@U2leader
@f2
= 2q
2(1  q)  1
2
22q
(2  3q)f1 + (w1   w2)
(f1 + f2)2
We can evaluate the sign by looking at the sign of
q(1  q)  1
2
2(2  3q)f1 + (w1   w2)
(f1 + f2)2
After plugging in 2 and the equilibrium q (8) and (10) we get
3
2
(f2   (w1   w2)) (f1 + (w1   w2))2
(f1 + f2)3
> 0
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Hence, religious leaders would always like to set the maximal f2 possible.
We now turn to the question how an increase in f2 a¤ects the utility of the
minority. This depends whether the increase in f2 is due to an increase in
u22 or a decrease in u21. The utility of the minority is given by
U2 = V
22   (1 2q)2q   1
2
(2q
)2
= V 22  2q + 1
2
(2q
)2
so that
@U2
@u21
=  @2q

@u21
(1 2q) :
In words, an increase in cultural superiority (decreasing u21) harms utility
if it leads to an increase in equilibrium educational e¤ort. This is the case if
@2q

@u21
< 0
or
  1
1 +2
+
12
(1 +2)
2 < 0
which is always the case.
For a change in u22 the calculation is
@U2
@u22
= 1  @2q

@u22
(1 2q) > 0:
The minority always benets from an increase in u22 and su¤ers from a
decrease in u21:
B Proof of Proposition 2
Note that @2
@f1
= 0 so that the change in indirect utility of the cultural leader
is given by
@U2leader
@f1
=
1
2
22q
(2  3q)@q

@f1
(20)
which is positive for all q < 2
3
as @q

@f1
> 0.
The utility of the minority is given by
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U2 = P
22V 22 + P 21V 21   1
2
d22
which can be written as
U2 = V
22   q(1  d2)2   1
2
d22 (21)
in equilibrium d2 = 2q
U2 = V
22   (1 2q)2q   1
2
(2q
)2 :
Note that the change of utility with 2q is
@U2
@2q
=  1 + 2q < 0
as 2q < 1:
Now we are ready to show that cultural alienation is not in the minoritys
interest. Cultural dislike towards the minority, f1, does not a¤ect V 22 but
a¤ects the minoritys utility through 2q = 121+2 as follows
@2q

@f1
=
2 (1 +2) 12
(1 +2)
2
@1
@f1
=
22
(1 +2)
2 > 0
which means that
@U2
@f1
< 0:
C Proof of Proposition 3
We know that
@U2leader
@f2
= 2q
2(1  q)  1
2
22q
(2  3q)f1 + (w1   w2)
(f1 + f2)2
= 2

1
1 +2
2
1  1
1 +2

 1
2
22
1
1 +2

2  3 1
1 +2

1
(1 +2)
2
=
3
2
(1 +2)
 422
3
1
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and
@U2leader
@f1
=
1
2
22
1
1 +2
(2  3 1
1 +2
)
@q
@f1
=
1
2
22
1
1 +2
(2  3 1
1 +2
)

1
1 +2
  1
(1 +2)
2

=
1
2
(1 +2)
 4 (22  1)321
If raising f1 and f2 cost the same the leader prefers raising f2 if
@U2leader
@f2
>
@U2leader
@f1
or
321 > (22  1)2
so that the leader is indi¤erent between the two at
321 +12   222 = 0
or
1 =
 2 
p
22 + 24
2
2
6
as only positive numbers make sense we therefore have
1 =
2
3
2
which implies that the leader prefers raising f2 for all
1 >
2
3
2
() q > 2
5
:
D Proof of Proposition 4
Note rst that
@2q

@(w1   w2) = 1  2q

@q
@(w1   w2) =
1
f1 + f2
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with U2leader = 12 (2q
)2 (1   q) the long term utility change with wage
discrimination is then
@U2leader
@(w1   w2) =
1
2
2 (2q
) (1  q) (1  2q)  1
f1 + f2
1
2
(2q
)2
= [2 (1  2q)  q]1
2
(2q
) (1  q)
The maximum is therefore at q = 2
5
:
E Proof of Proposition 5
The leader would like to increase alienation as long as this increases his utility,
namely
@U2leader
@f1
= 2q
2(1  q)@2
@f1
+
1
2
22q(2  3q)
@q
@f1
> 0 (22)
Using the equilibrium q dened by (12) and 2 = f2   f1 in the rst
order condition for the religious leader (22) we get after some algebra
@US2leader
@f1
=
1
2
22q
(1 + )
(f1 + f2)3

( 2f 21   f1f2(1 + 5) + 2f 22

We have to look at the sign of the square bracket only which is positive for
f1 < f

1 =
f2
4
p
(1 + 5)2 + 16  (1 + 5)

(23)
Hence the optimal level of alienation is given by f1 and we can show that
@f1
@
=
f2
42
"
1  1 + 13p
(1 + 5)2 + 16
#
< 0
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F Proof of Proposition 6
We rst prove the di¤erent equilibria outcomes.
1. Let condition (17) hold and suppose for contradiction that separation
is an equilibrium outcome. Then the optimal fear level fS1 is given
by (14). The minority will indeed choose not to integrate if fS1 >
w1   w2. Replacing fS1 by its value this condition can be rewritten as
f2 >
1+3
2
(w1   w2) which contradicts condition (17).
2. Condition (18) is equivalent to f I1 > (w1   w2) hence the minority
will be better o¤ in the minority sector.
3. When both equilibria are feasible it is easy to see that qI < qS since
qI > qS would require f I1 > w1 w2 which would induce the minority
to switch to the minority sector and make the integration equilibrium
disappear. To see which equilibrium is chosen by the leader we have to
compare the leaders utilities in the di¤erent equilibria, namely
US2leader =
1
2
(f2   (w1   w2))2
 
qS
2  
1  qS
with
U I2leader =
1
2
 
f2   f I1
2  
qI
2  
1  qI
Using the equilibrium values for qI and qS we get
US2leader =
1
2
(f2   (w1   w2))2 4
27
U I2leader =
1
2
 
f2   f I1
2(1 + )f I1
f I1 + f2
2
f2   f I1
f I1 + f2

=
1
2

f2   f I1
f I1 + f2
3
((1 + )f I1 )
2
where f I1 is given by (16)). If both equilibria exist the leader is better
o¤ in the separation equilibrium if US2leader > U
I
2leader or equivalently if
4 (f2   (w1   w2))2 (f I1 + f2)3   27(f2   f I1 )3((1 + )f I1 )2 > 0 (24)
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Replacing f I1 by its value in (24) and rearranging we obtain condition
(19), namely
(1 
p
B)f2 > (w1   w2)
where B is dened by
B =
27
64
 (+ 1)2

5+ 1 
p
252 + 26+ 1
2  5+ 5 p252 + 26+ 13 p
252 + 26+ 1  (+ 1)3
(25)
Straightforward but tedious calculations show that B < 1:
G Proof of Proposition 7
We rst look at condition (18) and rewrite it as
f2
4
(
p
(1 + 5)2 + 16  (1 + 5)) > (w1   w2)
It is immediate that a lower (w1   w2) makes the condition more easily
satised. It is also easy to see that the left hand side increases in f2 and
increases in .
Next we look at condition (19). Since B < 1, condition (19) is more likely
to bind with higher f2.
To know how the condition changes with  we need to look at the sign
of the derivative of B with respect to these parameters. We rewrite B as
B =  27
64
 (+ 1)2

5+ 1 
p
252 + 26+ 1
2  5+ 5 p252 + 26+ 13 
+ 1 p252 + 26+ 13
First observe that the derivative of
 
5+ 5 p252 + 26+ 13 > 0 with
respect to  is negative, because (5  25+13p
252+26+1
) < 0.
Now lets look at the derivative of the remaining terms depending on ,
namely of
 (+ 1)2
 
5+ 1 p252 + 26+ 12 
+ 1 p252 + 26+ 13 < 0
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with respect to . Observe that  (+ 1)2 = 3 + 22 + . Hence the sign
of the derivative is equal to the sign of
+ 1 
p
252 + 26+ 1
  
32 + 4+ 1
 
5+ 1 
p
252 + 26+ 1
2
+

+ 1 
p
252 + 26+ 1

5+ 1 
p
252 + 26+ 1



5  50+ 26
2
p
252 + 26+ 1

 3(+ 1)2

5+ 1 
p
252 + 26+ 1
2
1  50+ 26
2
p
252 + 26+ 1

=
+ 1p
252 + 26+ 1

 p
252 + 26+ 1 ((1 + 3) (252 + 26+ 1) + 1753 + 1 + 49+ 1912)
 (12504 + 2 + 9722 + 104+ 21203)

Looking at the bracket we need to compare
p
252 + 26+ 1
 
(1 + 3)
 
252 + 26+ 1

+ 1753 + 1 + 49+ 1912

with
12504 + 2 + 9722 + 104+ 21203:
Taking squares and looking at the di¤erence we get
2562
 
3754 + 7763 + 5262 + 128+ 3

> 0
So the entire sign of the derivative is positive. Hence we have a sign change
in the derivative for both expressions and therefore we get that increasing 
leads to a lower B, so the condition becomes less binding.
Finally we look at condition (17). It is easy to see that its right hand
side, namely 1+3
2
(w1 w2), increases in (w1 w2) and decreases in . Hence
the condition is more easily violated when the opposite happens.
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